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266 PEOPLE V. HEADLEE. 
[18 c. (2d) 
[Crim. No. 4349. In Bank.-July 23, .1941.] 
THE PEOPLE,' Respondent, v. ORVILLE M. HEADLEE, 
Appellant. 
[1] Criminal Law.....,-Appeal-Questions of Law and Fact-Where 
Testimony is Inherently Improbable-What Constitutes In-
herent Improbability.-A question of law authorizing theap-
pellate court. to set aside a conviction is presented where the 
evidence is inherently improbable. In such circumstances, the 
court will presume the verdict was the result of passion and 
prejudice. To be improbable on its face the evidence must 
assert that something has occurred that it does not seem 
possible could have occurred under the circumstances dis-
closed. The improbability must be apparent; evidence which 
is unusual or inconsistent is not necessarily improbable. 
[2] Rape-Appeal-Review of Particular Findings-Matters Af-
fecting Consent.-A conviction of rape was set aside on the 
ground of inherent improbability of the testimony where, not-
withstanding testimony that the victim entered a cabin and 
submitted to sexual intercourse upon defendant's order while 
he was armed, there were circumstances negativing her non-
consent, and where, moreover, the jury had acquitted defend-
ant of a prior act charged despite the witness' testimony re-
lating thereto was as positive as that relating to the act of 
which the defendant was convicted. 
[3] Robbery _ Review - Review of Evidence.-A conviction of 
robbery was set aside on appeal where it was based on testi-
mony as to the payment of part of the cabin rental by the 
operator of a taxicab pursuant to order' of the defendant 
while armed, where there was also testimony that the witness 
left the office to ascertain the license number of the car and 
returned, and where there was no reference in the testimony 
of police officers to questions addressed by them to the de-
fendant with respect to the asserted charges of kidnaping for 
the purpose of robbery, or robbery. 
[4] Kidnaping-Evidence-Kidnaping for Purpose of Robbery.-
A conviction of kidnaping for the purpose of robbery was set 
aside on .the grou:nd of inherent improbability of the testi-
mony where it was based on testimony tending to show that 
the defendant, while in a taxicab, placed a gun at the driver's 
1. See 8 Cal. Jur. 590. 
Melt. Dig. References: 1. Criminal Law, §§ 1322, 1322 (1); 2-
Rape, § 94 (5); 3. Robbery, § 44; 4. Kidnaping, § 7. 
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back and directed its movements until reaching ali auto-court 
where, after the renting of two cabins: the defendant and 
the driver had sexual intercourse with woman occupants of 
the cab, and where there was no reference in the testimony 
of the police officers to questions addressed by them to the 
defendant with respect to the purported charges of kidnaping 
or robbery. . 
APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County and from order denying new trial. Arthur 
Crum, Judge. ' Reversed. 
Mark F. Jones and W. L. Engelhardt for Appellant. 
Earl Warren, Attorney-General, and R. S. McLaughlin, 
Deputy Attorney-General, for Respondent. 
THE COURT.-In an information filed by the District 
Attorney of Los Angeles County, the defendant was charged 
with the commission of five distinct offenses. A jury trial 
resulted in his conviction and sentence on the three counts 
of kidnaping for purpose of robbery, robbery, and rape, the 
sentences thereon to run concurrently. The defendant wag 
acquitted on two other counts charging another rape and 
grand theft. Upon this appeal he challenges the sufficiency 
of the evidence to support the three verdicts of conviction 
and the judgments based thereon. 
[1] It is not the function of appellate courts to weigh evi-
dence. (People v. Tom Woo, 181 Cal. 315 [184 Pac. 389] 0; 
Peoplev. Tedesco, 1 Cal. (2d) 211 [34 Pac. (2d) 467] ; Peo-
ple v. Perkins, 8 Cal. (2d) 502 [66 Pac. (2d) 631].) Where, 
however, the evidence relied upon by the prosecution is so 
improbable as' to be incredible, and amounts to no evi-
dence, a question of law is presented which authorizes an 
appellate court to set aside a conviction. (People v. Dorland, 
2 Cal. (2d) 235 [40 Pac. (2d) 474] .) Under such circum-
stances an appellate court will assume that the verdict was 
the result of passion and prejudice. (People v. Niino, 183 
Cal. 126 [190 Pac. 626].) To be improbable on its face the 
evidence must assert that something has occurred that it does 
not seem possible could have occurred under the circumstances 
disclosed. The improbability must be apparent; evidence 
which is unusual or inconsistent is not necessarily improbable; 
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(People v. Braun, 14 Cal. (2d) 1 [92 Pac. (2d) 402] ; People 
v. Moreno, 26 Cal. App. (2d) 334 [79 Pac. (2d) 390].) In 
this case the inherent improbability of the testimony of the 
principal witnesses is readily apparent from an examination 
of the record. The five charges contained in the information 
arose out· of a sequence of alleged acts purportedly occurring 
within a few hours. In considering the evidence it is relevant 
to consider the evidence addressed to the two charges of 
which the defendant stands acquitted, for it contributes to 
the improbability of the evidence addressed to the three 
charges of which the defendant stands convicted. 
[2-4] Miss Helen Cash, 22 years of age, testified as follows: 
On the evening of April 14, 1940, she left a moving picture 
theatre in Compton with her friend Mrs. Goodwin at ap-
proximately 10 :50 p. m., and hailed a taxicab. She had met 
the driver, John Fontana, on a previous occasion, and she 
and Mrs. Goodwin sat in the front seat with Fontana. 
Shortly after they entered the cab Fontana made a stop and 
received a call to go to the McDonald party house, a highway 
tavern. They arrived there at about 11 :00 p. m. Fontana 
went to the tavern and came back to the cab with the defend-
ant who said he wanted to go to Southgate. The defendant 
sat in the back seat and during the ride "pulled guns" on 
them. At the time she saw only one gun which the defend-
ant held in his right hand "on Mr. Fontana's neck" while 
telling him to keep going and threatening them if they at-
tempted to attract attention. Later, the defendant asked 
Fontana" what girl belonged to him," and when Mrs. Good-
win replied "I do" the defendant put the gun on the shoulder 
of the witness and told her to get in the back seat with him. 
She looked at Fontana who suggested compliance, whereupon 
she climbed into' the back seat with the defendant. The de-
fendant then placed his right arm around her with the gun 
against her right temple, began to fondle her person and 
then, as she related, "he laid me down on the seat and at-
tacked me." Nothing was said by anyone, and during the 
act of intercourse she did not see the gun. Subsequently, the 
defendant told Fontana to drive into an auto-court, which in 
time he did. Thereupon the defendant put the gun in Fon-
tana's ribs, told him to get out of the cab and directed the 
witness to get back into the front seat with Mrs. Goodwin 
while he and Fontana proceeded to the office of the auto-court. 
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At this point, in answering a question of the district at-
torney, the witness volunteered the information that, when 
leaving with the defendant for the auto-court office, "Mr. 
Fontana left the car running so if we wanted to we could 
drive it off." Immediately the district attorney said, "I ask 
tha t be stricken out," to which the trial court replied " Yes. " 
How much of the answer, of which the foregoing was only a 
part, was requested by the district attorney to be stricken is 
uncertain. 
The witness then went on to testify: .As the two men went 
into the office of the auto-court she did not see the defendant 
do anything to conceal the gun he held on Fontana's ribs. 
The two men returned shortly, the defendant getting into 
the back seat. Fontana drove the cab to cabins numbered 11 
and 12 and put the cab in the shelter provided therefor. The 
witness did not see the gun during these proceedings. The 
defendant asked for the key to the cab, which Fontana gave 
him. He then displayed two guns and threatened them if 
they "tried to do anything." Mrs. Goodwin and Fontana 
went into cabin 12 and the witness and the defendant into 
cabin 11. She closed the door behind her, .and it was not 
thereafter locked. She inquired "where do you turn the 
light on here," whereupon the defendant lighted the cabin. 
The defendant placed one gun on the dresser and pointed the 
other at her and told her to undress. She undressed and 
got into bed. The defendant undressed, placed a pistol under 
the pillow and got into bed. In response to a query as to 
what then happened, the witness replied, "Well, we had 
sexual intercourse again." She did not remember the de-
fendant saying anything immediately preceding and during 
this time. The defendant then told her to do a revolting act, 
which she did, assertedly in fear of bodily harm from the gun. 
She submitted each time, however, without any plea, remon-
strance or struggle. Shortly after, when officers knocked at 
the door she went to the bathroom, dressed, and then told 
the officers what the defendant had done. 
·On cross-examination the witness again related substantially 
the same story with the addition of the following: The de-
fendant and Fontana were in the office of the auto-court for 
about five minutes. During that time she did not always 
watch the defendant but talked to Mrs. Goodwin. The latter 
. suggested getting out and running, but the witness rejected 
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the idea because the defendant would shoot them or Fontana. 
During the episode in the cab Mrs. Goodwin looked around 
to the back seat but none of the three protested the defend-
ant's conduct. The witness was assertedly in fear because 
.of the gun and defendant's earlier threats. Just before en-
tering the cabin the defendant requested Fontana to awaken 
him in the morning and said, "I will buy breakfast because 
I have five fifty-dollar bills in my pocket." Before entering 
the cabin she did not plead or remonstrate with the defend-
ant. When the defendant told her to undress she did not 
protest; instead, she "never said a thing." 
Mike Gasparich, a garage owner, testified that the defend-
ant had worked for him. He identified the two guns possessed 
by the defendant as having been found in the glove compart-
ment of a wrecked car which had been towed into his garage. 
The guns and other things, he testified, had been removed 
with the defendant's assistance from the car and placed in 
a box in the garage office. 
Robert Thomas, a bartender at the McDonald party house, 
testified that' the defendant appeared there about 9 :30 p. m., 
and ordered a drink; that he was showing off two pistols; that 
the witness asked for them and "put them behind the bar"; 
and that he returned them to the defendant before he left 
at about 11 :00 p. m. in a cab which had been called at his 
request. 
John Fontana, the cab driver, related a series of events 
substantially similar to Miss Cash's testimony. He testified 
as follows: As he drove along with the two women in the 
front seat the defendant in the back seat said "get going," 
and he felt "cold steel" against his neck. He did not see 
what later occurred in the back seat between the defendant 
and Miss Cash, but in the rear-view mirror he could see the 
defendant who kept his face toward him most of the time. 
When he entered the office of the auto-court he left the motor 
running, the lights on, and the key in the car. . The defendant 
kept the gun against his ribs at all times, and there was light 
enough at one time for it to be seen by the proprietor. The 
defendant started paying the proprietor for the two cabins 
rented and then said to the· witness, "You pay the balance 
whatever it is." He paid the balance ($1.50) at the de-
fendant's command. (This transaction constitutes the basis 
of the robbery conviction.) After the witness had signed the 
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register the proprietor asked for the license number of the 
car, and he went to the door of the office to look at the license 
with the defendant at his back at all times. He and Mrs. 
Goodwin entered cabin 12 pursuant to the defendant's direc-
tions and he later got out through the bathroom window and 
summoned police officers. 
On cross-examination the witness testified that when he and 
Mrs. Goodwin entered. cabin 12 the defendant told them to 
lock themselves in, but that the defendant did not ask for 
the key. He stated that at the time of trial he was out of 
the taxicab business, the adverse publicity resulting therefrom 
causing women to refuse to ride with him. 
Mrs. Goodwin told substantially the same story as Miss 
Cash and Fontana. It is relevant here only to note that she 
testified that she saw the defendant on top of Miss Cash in 
the back seat of the car with a gun at her head, and that she 
(the witness) thereupon "jabbed" Fontana in the ribs and 
he looked at her and smiled. 
J ames Roberts, proprietor of the auto-court where the 
quartet' stopped, testified as follows. The defendant and 
Fontana came to his office about 12 :15 a. m., alid said they 
wanted two cabins. He told them they would have to regis-
ter their "wives" and the license number of their car. 
Fontana "went out far enough so he could see it" and "then 
he came back and put the license down." Upon inquiry 
Fontana was informed that the charge for the cabins would 
be $4.00, whereupon the defendant, after searching his 
pockets, found some small change which he placed on the 
counter with the request that it be counted. It added up to 
$2.50, whereupon the defendant asked Fontana if he had any 
money. Fontana then turned over $1.50 which made up 
the difference. On cross-examination the witness testified 
that when Fontana left the office to get the car license num-
ber "he 'Yent out past this l\lr. Headlee [defendant] and went 
out on the step and looked down . . . and came back and 
put it down." During all of this time the defendant was 
doing nothing other than leaning against the office desk. The 
car was so parked that the witness "could not see it from 
the office." 
The defendant, who is 25 years of age, took the stand in 
his own defense and testified as follows: He and the proprie-
tor of the garage where he worked found two guns in a' 
272 PEOPLE V. HEADLEE. [18 C. (2d) 
wrecked car which had been brought into the garage. On 
the afternoon of April 14, 1940, he took the guns with him 
to deliver them to the sheriff's office at Firestone Station and 
on the way stopped at a tavern. He later proceeded with a 
friend in the latter's car to the ~fcDonald party house which 
his friend subsequently left. The witness then took the 
guns from the car and openly carried them into the McDonald 
party house where he showed them to a person sitting at 
the bar. The bartender placed them under the bar to 0 bvia te 
any fear among other patrons. The witness later had a cab 
called and took back the guns as he left. As he walked to 
the cab with Fontana the latter said, "I have a couple of 
hotshot girls out here, do you mind if they go along . . . 
they are hustlers." The defendant said it was all right with 
him. As he walked to the cab he had one gun in his pocket 
and the other in its holster in his hand, and as he entered 
the cab he placed the latter weapon on the seat beside hini. 
As they were riding he asked Fontana which girl was with 
him, to which Mrs. Goodwin replied, "I am." He then 
asked Miss Cash if she would join him in the back seat, which 
she did by climbing over the front seat. He" loved her up 
a little" and she offered no objection. After a while Miss 
Cash asked him if he wanted to go to a cabin. He assented. 
Fontana said he knew of an auto-court and drove there. The 
witness and Fontana entered the office and the latter signed 
the register. When informed that the cabins would cost 
$4.00 the defendant went through his pockets and brought 
out $2.50 which he placed on the counter and then asked 
Fontana if he had any money. Fontana replied affirma-
tively and brought out $1.50, which he pushed over the desk 
to the proprietor. The quartet then proceeded to the cabins. 
While opening the cabin doors he asked Fontana not to run 
off and leave him out" there. Fontana promised not to and 
gave the defendant the key to the car. The witness and Miss 
Cash entered one of the cabins and he placed one gun in a 
dresser drawer and, as was his custom at his garage head-
quarters, placed one gun under a pillow. Miss Cash said 
she would have to have her money first. Upon objection that 
she asked too much money she replied, "Well, Johnny [Fon-
tana] will have to have his part of it." They undressed and 
engaged in an act of intercourse and other conduct with the 
consent and solicitation of Miss Cash. When the officers 
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knocked he told them to come in, that the door was open. He 
denied having intercourse with Miss Cash in the cab and 
also denied ever threatening any of the three or making them 
do anything against their will. 
From the foregoing testimony of the principal prosecution 
witnesses, the conclusion that those witnesses did not consent, 
either actively or passively, to the occurrences of that evening 
is incredible. None of them offered any objection when the 
defendant allegedly engaged in an act of sexual intercourse 
with Miss Cash in the cab against her wilL Nor did they 
in any manner attempt to prevent the defendant from carry-
ingout his act. On the contrary, Mrs. Goodwin testified that 
when she "jabbed" Fontana in the ribs during this episode 
he looked at her and smiled. These are not the normal ac-
tions of persons outraged by conduct such as that charged 
to the defendant. They claim to have been in fear of the de-
fendant's guns, yet Miss Cash testified that the defendant 
kept the gun against her head and person during the act of 
intercourse, while according to Fontana's story the gun was 
pressed against his neck at all times. 
It is significant that Fontana and the defendant left the 
. cab for five minutes or more to make arrangements for cabins 
at the auto-court office. Both Miss Cash and Fontana· testi-
fied that the motor of the car was running all during this 
period. The proprietor of the auto-court testified that he 
could not see the cab from the office. Miss Cash admitted 
that she was not watching the men at all times when they 
were in the office, but, instead, was talking with Mrs. Good-
win. No effort was made by either woman to drive the car 
away or to leave the car and attempt an escape by foot 
under (!over of darkness, though admittedly Mrs. Goodwin 
had suggested the latter course. This is not the conduct of 
a person who has been kidnaped or assertedly the victim of a 
previous attack. 
The conduct of Fontana while in the office of the auto-
court was not that of a person who was being kidnaped and 
robbed. According to his own testimony he went beyond 
the·door of the office to ascertain the license number of his 
car. The proprietor of the auto-court testified that Fontana 
went out on the step of the office past the defendant, who at 
the time was merely leaning on the desk. According to his 
testimony, the two men were some distance apart at that 
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point and he observed no gun being held by the defendant. 
The money transaction in the office discloses only a financial 
inability on the defendant's part to defray the entire cost of 
the cabin rentals, and a request that Fontana contribute 
thereto. 
The improbability of the ,prosecution testimony that de-
fendant demanded the key to the car to prevent the escape of 
his asserted victims, and the reasonableness of defendant's 
explanation that the key was voluntarily delivered to him 
as a gesture of good faith in response to his request that the 
parties not 'leave him at the auto-court, are attested by the 
fact that defendant concededly permitted Fontana and Mrs. 
Goodwin to enter a separate cabin, they retaining the key 
therefor, thus freeing themselves from the asserted coercion. 
The conduct of Miss Cash in the cabin does not reveal any 
opposition on her part to the proceedings. She made no ob-
jection to entering the cabin with the defendant. Upon en-
tering the cabin she closed the door behind her and inquired 
where the light could be turned on. This action indicates 
that the defendant must have preceded her into the' cabin 
and thus did not force her to enter. The asserted attack in 
the cabin admittedly took place without any plea or word of 
protest or objection from her. Concededly, she exerted no 
physical effort to prevent the alleged assault. Certain pal~ts 
of her testimony indicate that, although unmarried, she had 
previously engaged in acts of sexual intercourse. In the light 
of all that had gone before, with the opportunities of escape 
above mentioned, we think it highly improbable that the total 
absence of objection and resistance was prompted by the de-
fendant's asserted earlier threats. 
The jury acquitted the defendant of the charge of rape in 
the taxicab, yet Miss Cash testified unequivocally to the oc-
currence of an act of sexual intercourse between her and 
the defendant at that time. The jury therefore.-either en-
tirely disbelieved the prosecution testimony and concluded 
that the act,did not occur, or it concluded that th~ract was 
performed with the' consent of Miss Cash. If the jury en-
tirely disbelieved the witnesses as to the occurrence of the 
first act of intercourse, it could not reasonably believe the 
testimony as to the second act of intercourse, and its verdict 
to the contrary must have been the result of passion and 
prejudice. The first act was aRSertedly committed in the 
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presence of all three witnesses; the second act supposedly oc-
curred when the defendant and Miss Cash were alone in the 
cabin and Miss Cash was the only prosecution witness to 
testify to its occurrence. Her testimony as to the occurrence 
of the first act was just as positive as her testimony as to 
the occurrence of the,second. If the jury concluded that the 
first act of intercourse actually took place but that it occurred 
with the consent of Miss Cash, it is highly improbable that 
she did not consent to the second act, particularly in view of 
the fact that she offered no objection or resistance to it. 
The asserted silence or admissions of the defendant in re-
sponse to questions by the officers as to his having had inter-
course with Miss Cash do not require a different conclusion. 
Read in its entirety the evidence merely shows an admission 
by the defendant of sexual intercourse with Miss Cash, with 
her consent. The testimony of the deputy sheriff Welever 
as to the girl's charge made in the cabin and the defendant's 
response thereto, when read in connection with' the girl's 
testimony at ,the trial describing the circumstances surround-
ing commission of the alleged attacks, definitely indicates that 
she was referring to the asserted rape in the cab, of which the 
defendant stands acquitted. It is significant that there is 
no reference in the testimony of the officers to questions ad-
dressed. by them to the defendant with respect to the asserted 
charges of kidnaping for the purpose of robbery, or robbery. 
The judgments and order denying a new trial are, and each 
is, hereby reversed. 
[Sac. No. 5325. In Bank.-July 23, 1941.J 
THE UNION LEAGUE CLUB (a Corporation), Respond-
ent, v. CHARLES' G. JOHNSON,as State Treasurer, 
etc., Appellant. 
[la,lbl Taxation-Miscellaneous Taxes-Sales Tax-Social Club 
Serving Liquor.-Under the Retail Sales Tax Act, as it stood 
in 1935 (Stats. 1933, p. 2599; Deering's Gen. Laws, 1937, 
Act 8493),a bona fide social club with limited and select mem-
1. See 10 Cal. Jur. Ten;..year Supp. 568. 
McK. Dig. References: 1. Taxation, § 459; 2. Statutes, § 184. 
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